We provide information on each of the attacks in Table S1 . For each attack, we show the date when it occurred, the province 11 where it took place, the name of the victim, how the attack was perpetrated (e.g., shooting, car bomb), whether the victim 12 died or was injured, the victim's status (e.g., civilian, or member of the military or the police), and the political party that was 13 in office. We also show when the attack took place in relation to the timing of the interview. National media outlets covered 14 all the ETA attacks immediately after they occurred, so we assume that the individuals in our sample were aware of them 15 the same day or, at the latest, the day after they took place. For additional context, in Table S7 , we show when each attack 16 occurred in relation to the most recent and next general election.
Attacks 6 and 7 overlap with the same survey (CIS 2152). We split that survey in two non-overlapping parts and use each part for separate attacks. In Figure S1 , we show the evolution of the conflict over time in terms of the number of ETA attacks between 1960 and 2006
19
(1). It shows that the late 1970s were the most violent years of this conflict and that ETA was quite active in the 1980s and 20 1990s. Our study focuses on attacks that ETA perpetrated between 1989 and 1997, a period in which the terrorist organization 21 perpetrated attacks frequently. Figure S2 and Table S3 show the distribution of ETA's attacks across the different provinces
22
of Spain. Álava, Guipúzcoa, and Vizcaya, the three provinces composing the Basque Country, in the central northern part Guipúzcoa  255  309  Vizcaya  172  209  Madrid  53  123  Navarra  35  42  Álava  34  43  Barcelona  18  53  Sevilla  3  7  Granada  3  3  Valencia  3  3  Zaragoza  3  14  Alicante  2  5  Logroño  2 
CIS Fieldwork Methodology

28
The CIS has a very decentralized fieldwork structure. Forty province coordinators receive simultaneous instructions and survey
29
questionnaires from the head of fieldwork from Madrid (2). These province coordinators have several local enumerators working
30
for them, to whom they distribute the materials and the assigned localities and sections within localities (i.e., a few streets 31 within the locality) where they have to conduct the door-to-door interviews. Local enumerators do not have a particular order 32 assigned for the interviews; they choose where to start and where to end the fieldwork depending on their individual logistical 33 needs and preferences. Enumerators may go to different localities and sections of localities, but it is important to keep in mind 34 that they are assigned specific localities and sections of localities, which they cannot skip. Within their assigned localities
35
and sections, enumerators follow a "random route" system (what is called "sistema de rutas aleatorias") to find individuals.
36
And while they need to fulfill gender and age quotas determined by the sampling, they have a lot of leeway on how to do 37 it. For example, when they ring the bell of an apartment, they can choose who to interview in the apartment in order to fill 38 their assigned quotas (they can only interview one person in each selected household, though). that the interviewers made to reach a particular respondent; there are no significant differences before and after the attacks.
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We also examine patterns in missing data and in non-response. We find that 3.27 percent of interviewees have missing 62 data on the question that asks about their vote in a hypothetical election. In most cases, these individuals have also missing 63 data on all or the majority of other questions (possibly because of the interview ended before it was completed). We examine 64 whether missing data in the outcome variable are more likely among those interviewed after the attacks and find no evidence 65 for this pattern. Similarly, 16.05 percent of interviewees declined to respond to the survey question that we use to measure our 66 outcomes. We examine whether refusing to respond was more likely after the attacks and find no evidence that this was the 67 case. In our analyses, we drop all individuals who refused to answer the question about voting.
68
An additional source of bias could arise from the non-random selection of provinces that were surveyed first. This is not a 69 major concern because the CIS tried to conduct fieldwork simultaneously across the territory of Spain (see the CIS Fieldwork
70
Methodology section). However, it could still be that the timing of fieldwork in some provinces was different from others, so we Table S4 shows descriptive statistics for the demographic attributes that we observe in the surveys and that we include as smaller than .01 and only two are below .05. Because the t-tests for differences in means that we carry out within each of the 82 attributes are not independent of each other, we also report results from F-tests of joint significance. To do so, we regress the 83 treatment variable (i.e., an indicator for being interviewed after the attack) on the set of dummies that configure all categories 84 of a given attribute (e.g., all indicators for educational attainment) and test for the joint significance of the set of dummies.
85
The p-values from the F-tests of joint significance show that none of the demographic attributes of the interviewees predicts 86 treatment status. Again, the F-tests include the set of province-by-survey fixed effects.
87
In a final test of covariate balance, we regress the treatment variable on all predictors shown in Table S4 (arbitrarily 88 dropping one for each set of attributes) and the set of province-by-survey fixed effects. As reported at the bottom of the the attacks are statistically equivalent in terms of the attributes that we observe. All tests of significance shown in Table S4 91 are conducted within +/-3 days of the day of the attacks. Examining covariate balance within 1 day and 5 days from the 92 attack yields similar results in all tests of significance.
93
Overall, Table S4 shows a strong balance across the two groups along the majority of measured pre-treatment attributes.
94
There are three characteristics, however, that show statistically significant differences across treatment and control units.
95
Individuals interviewed after the attacks are 2 percentage points more likely to have voted in the previous election, 3 percentage 96 points less likely to be uneducated, and 4 percentage points less likely to live in a city with at least 1,000,000 residents. Of 97 these unbalanced attributes, the most problematic for our research design is the difference in reported participation in the 98 past election. Although this difference is statistically significant, we believe that it is not substantively significant given 99 the pre-attack mean in reported participation, 79%. Furthermore, turnout in the prior election is measured retroactively 100 post-treatment, which raises the possibility of this difference being a result of reporting bias. To assess the implications of 101 these pre-treatment differences, we report estimates with and without pre-treatment controls in all our models, and we test for 102 unobservable selection into the treatment using the coefficient stability approach proposed by Oster (4). The sample is restricted to observations within + 3 days of the attack. The balance in covariates is robust to focusing on observations within + 1 and + 5 days of the attack. Differences in means are computed using a regression of each covariate on the treatment variable post and the set of attack-by-province fixed effect. Tests of joint significance are carried by regressing the treatment variable on the corresponding set of predictors and attack-byprovince fixed effect and then testing for the the joint significance of the predictors using a Wald test (F-test). All tests of individual and joint significance account for clustering within the primary sampling units of each study.
-0 
Difference-in-Differences Estimation
105
In Table S5 we present results from a difference-in-difference estimation strategy similar to the one used in other studies of 106 terrorism and electoral outcomes (5, 6). To do so, we aggregate the individual-level data up to the province level. For each 107 survey and province, we compute the percentage of respondents who answered that they would participate in the election 108 before and after the attacks. We also compute, for each survey and province, the percentage of respondents who answered 109 that they did not vote in the prior election-also before and after the attacks. Each observation in the data set represents a 110 pre-/post-attack measure of participation (which we index as i) for each province (indexed as p) and survey (indexed as s). We whether the outcome is measured before or after the attacks. W p are province fixed effects, and Z s are survey fixed effects.
115 pre-/post-attack period i in province p and survey s, (% Absenteeism) ips .
117
We run three specifications for each outcome: Models 1 and 4 regress the outcome on a post-attack indicator, province fixed 118 effects, and survey fixed effects; Models 2 and 5 add the percentage of respondents who answered that they did not vote in 119 the prior election as a control; and Models 3 and 6 add the full set of controls that are listed in Clustered standard errors by province in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. When included, the set of controls are the same ones than those in Table S4 (in % form). All models are weighted by the number of respondents. Clustered standard errors by province and municipality size in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. When included, the set of controls are the same ones than those in Table S4 . 
Additional Plots of Effect Heterogeneity
Effect on Vote Switches
Assessing the Contribution of Provinces and Attacks to the Fixed Effects Estimation
126
A well-known property of the OLS fixed effects estimator is that groups with more variation in treatment assignment will have 127 more weight in the estimation (7). In this case, more weight will be given to provinces where there are balanced numbers 128 of before-and after-attack interviewees, as opposed to provinces where most interviews falling before or after the date of 129 attack. Similarly, the estimator will give more weight to surveys in which there is a more balanced number of before-and 130 after-attack interviewees. In Fig. S13 , we show that, although there is variation in the degree to which the treatment varies 131 within provinces and surveys, no outliers appear to be driving the estimation. One of the limitations of using survey data is that turnout may be overreported in surveys (8). We look at actual turnout in 157 the national elections that took place after the attacks and compare it to the turnout estimated in the CIS surveys we are 158 analyzing; of course, there is variation in the timing between the attacks and the national elections. As we have shown in Table   159 S2 above, some elections took place a few months after the attacks while others took place after a few years.
160
In Table S7 below, we show that all the surveys in our study tend to overestimate actual turnout in Spanish national 161 elections that happened after the surveys were fielded. However, they tend to overestimate turnout less than other CIS surveys. 
Coverage of the Attacks in the Spanish Media Outlets
172
One of the key assumptions of our research design is that, regardless of where each attack occurred, individuals from all 173 provinces in Spain were potentially exposed to the attacks through their coverage in national media outlets. To examine the 174 extent to which this was true, we analyze the media coverage of each attack in the five newspapers with the highest circulation 175 in the country, the Spanish public radio (RNE), and the main public television channel (RTVE). We use standard methodology 176 in media analysis (9) to examine the coverage that each attack received. In Tables S8 to S10 and Figs. ? ? to ??, we show the minutes of footage that each attack received on the national public radio and TV news programs as well as their coverage in the major national newspapers. In Table S11 , we provide links to the front covers of the major newspapers in the day after the attacks.
Except for one (the assassination of Francisco Almagro Carmona on June 3, 1990), all attacks in our study appeared on the 181 front pages of all five newspapers. In addition, most of the attacks were covered by the newspapers for several consecutive 182 days, and the most prominent ones, those of politicians José María Aznar, Miguel Angel Blanco, and Gregorio Ordoñez, were 183 covered in the newspapers over 10 consecutive days. In addition, all the attacks were covered by radio news, and except for 184 one, all received substantial coverage in the television news summaries.
185
Coverage of the Attacks in National Media Outlets 186 1 We examine appearance in the consecutive days by looking at the coverage that the attack received in the 2:00pm news summary, which is the one with the largest audience. 1 We examine appearance in the consecutive days by looking at the coverage that the attack received in the 2:00pm news summary, which is the one with the largest audience. 
